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RELIGIOUS BELIEF AS QUALIFICATION OF
A WITNESS
J. CRAwFoRD BIGGs*
In discussing the question of the qualification of a witness to
testify because of his religious belief or disbelief, the law in North
Carolina will first be considered, then the law in the other states and
finally the law in the Federal Courts.
THE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA
The question of the competency of a witness to testify on ac-
count of his religious belief came first before the Supreme Court of
North Carolina in 1856, in the case of Shaw v. Moore.' There was
objection to a witness testifying on account of his religious belief.
The trial judge held the witness competent and on appeal his ruling
was affirmed. The Supreme Court said:
"The case presents this question: Is a person who 'believes in the
obligation of an oath on the Bible; who believes in God and Jesus
Christ, and that God will punish in this world, all violators of his law,
and that the sinner will inevitably be punished in this world for each
and every sin committed; but there will be no punishment after death,
and that in another world all will be happy and equal to the angels',
a competent witness?
"The law requires two guarantees of the truth of what a witness
is about to state; he must be in the fear of punishment by the laws
of man, and he must also be in the fear of punishment by the laws of
God, if he states what is false; in other words, there must be a tem-
poral and also a religious sanction to his oath. In reference to the
first, no question is made; but it is insisted, that the religious sanction
required, is the fear of punishment in a future state of existence.
"This position is not sustained by the reason of the thing, for, if
we divest ourselves of the prejudice growing out of preconceived
opinions as to what we suppose to be the true teaching of the Bible,
it is clear that, in reference to a religious sanction, there is no ground
for making a distinction between the fear of punishment by the Su-
preme Being in this world, and the fear of punishment in the world to
come; both are based upon the sense of religion."
* Member of the North Carolina Bar, Raleigh, N. C. Judge of the Superior
Court, 1907-1911.
149 N. C. 25 (1856).
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Judge Pearson in Shaw v. Moore pointed out that in the old cases
it was "held to be the common law, that no infidel (in which class
Jews were included), could be sworn as a witness in the Courts of
England, which was a Christian country, and Lord Coke gives this
as his opinion, in which he says all the cases agree." Judge Pearson
criticized the reason assigned by Lord Coke as narrow-minded, illib-
eral, bigoted and unsound.
It is laid down by Lord Hale, notwithstanding the opinion of
Coke and the old cases, to be the common law, that a Jew is a com-
petent witness, and may be sworn on the Old Testament.
Afterwards, in the leading English case of Omychund v. Barker,2
it was decided "that a Gentoo, who was an infidel, who did not be-
lieve in either the Old or New Testament, but who believed in a God
as the Creator of the Universe, and that he is a rewarder of those
who do well, and an avenger of those who do ill, is according to the
common law, a competent witness," though it did not appear
"whether, according to the Gentoo religion, rewards and punishments
are to be in this world or in the world to come."
"That case," said Judge Pearson, "establishes the rule to be that
an infidel is a competent witness, provided he believes in the existence
of a Supreme Being who punishes the wicked, without reference to
the time of punishment. The substance of the thing is, every oath
must have a religious sanction."
Judge Pearson further said that if the statutes prescribing the
forms of oaths had the effect of excluding Jews and infidels, who
believe in a God, and Christians who do not believe in future rewards
and punishment, from the privilege of testifying, the statutes would
be in direct contravention of Section 19 of the Declaration of Rights:
"That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Al-
mighty God according to the dictates of their own conscience." a
The question of the religicus belief of a witness did not come be-
fore the Supreme Court of North Carolina again until 1914, in the
case of State v. Pitt.4 One of the witnesses testified that when he
kissed the book it meant that he would tell the truth; that if he should
tell a lie, they would put him in the lockup. When asked "What
else?" he replied "I don't know." The trial judge held the witness
competent. The Supreme Court held the ruling of the judge con-
21 Atk. 21, 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (1744).
'N. C. Const. (1868) Art. I, §26.
'166 N. C. 268, 80 S. E. 1060 (1914).
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clusive. The Court, however, said: "The fact that one of the wit-
nesses said he 'did not know' what punishment would happen to him
beyond punishment in jail, should not disqualify him, in view of the
other evidence showing his intelligence and sense of responsibility.
• . . If such reply from one who is honestly ignorant of what will
happen to him in another world, shall render him incompetent to tes-
tify, not only the administration of justice will often be hindered, but
unwilling witnesses can block needed investigations by professing like
ignorance."
Chief Justice Clark quoted at length with approval from the
opinion in Shaw v. Moore.5
The question was next before the Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina in 1922, in the case of Lanier v. Bryan,6 which was an action to
recover damages for the seduction of the plaintiff. When the plaintiff
was called as a witness, the defendant objected to her examination
on the ground that she was incapable of understanding the obligation
of an oath and mentally incapable of testifying.
The trial judge heard the testimony of an expert, in mental dis-
eases, found certain facts and held the plaintiff was a competent wit-
ness, and at the conclusion of her testimony, without specifically find-
ing the facts, again held that she was competent to testify.
In this case, Judge Adams for the Court, said: "The tests that
have usually been applied to determine the competency of a person
offered as a witness are those of age, mental power, religious belief,
and capacity to understand the nature and obligation of an oath."
In discussing the objection that the plaintiff was not influenced
by any religious belief and was not capable of comprehending the
solemnity, nature and purpose of an oath, Judge Adams said: "It
is conceded that a witness should be sensible to the obligation of the
oath that he assumes but apparently the interpretation of the expres-
sion has not been uniform," and he then quotes the language of Judge
Pearson in Shaw v. Moore,7 that the law requires two guarantees of
the truth of what a witness is about to state; he must be in the fear
of punishment by the laws of man and by the laws of God, if he states
what is false, but that the religious sanction does not require the fear
of punishment in a future state of existence, and that there must be
a temporal and also a religious sanction of the oath. Judge Adams
'Supra note 1.
184 N. C. 235, 114 S. E. 6 (1922).
'Supra note 1.
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in referring to State v. Pitt,8 said: "The decision approves the doc-
trine that the witness should have due appreciation of a moral duty
to tell the truth."
These are the only cases which have come before the Supreme
Court of North Carolina in which the religious views of witnesses
have been discussed. It will be observed in those cases, the trial
judges held the witnesses competent and the rulings of the lower
courts were affirmed. In Shaw v. Moore, the sole question involved
was whether the witness was disqualified because he stated that he
did not believe in punishment after death. The Supreme Court held
that this did not disqualify him. In State v. Pitt, the Supreme Court
held that the finding of the trial judge that the witness was competent
was not reviewable, but held, under the authority of Shaw v. Moore,
that the statement of the witness that he did not know what punish-
ment would happen to him beyond punishment in jail, did not dis-
qualify him. In Lanier v. Bryan,9 while the Court discussed the tests
for the competency of j witness, the question decided by the Court
was that where the trial judge after hearing the testimony of the wit-
ness and considering it in connection with other evidence, without
finding the facts, entered of record a general order adjudging the
witness competent to testify, such order was not reviewable.
Competency of an Atheist.
In no case which has been before the Supreme Court of North
Carolina has the competency of an atheist to testify been involved.
Two cases in North Carolina have discussed the competency of
an atheist to serve as a juror.
In State v'. Davis,10 the defendants were convicted of burglary and
after the verdict, they offered to show upon information secured after
the verdict, that one of the jurors disbelieved in the existence of
Almighty God. The trial court refused to hear the proof and judg-
ment was pronounced upon the defendants. The Supreme Court said
"If their motion had been allowed and they had proved that the juror
referred to was an atheist and that fact had only come to their knowl-
edge after the trial, the court might still have refused a new trial
without committing an error. Their objection to the juror comes
too late." If the juror had been challenged in apt time before he was
sworn as a juror on the ground that he was an atheist, and if the
'Supra note 4.
SSupra note 6.1080 N. C. 412 (1879).
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court had found that he was was an atheist, it seems clear that the
court would have held that he was incompetent to act as a juror.
In the case of State v. Levy," Judge Stacy in enumerating the
principal challenges to jurors "now recognized -by our practice," said
that if the person called for jury service "be an atheist or deny the
existence of Almighty God, he is presumed to be insensible to the
obligations of an oath."'12
The view has been taken in some jurisdictions that to exclude a
witness because of his lack of religious belief, the evidence must be
stronger than that required to exclude a juror.' 3
Oath.
The North Carolina Consolidated Statutes, Section 3188, declares
that: "Whereas lawful oaths for the discovery of truth and estab-
lishing right are necessary and highly conducive to the important end
of good government; and being most solemn appeals to Almighty
God, as the omniscient witness of truth and the just and omnipotent
avenger of falsehood, such oaths, therefore, ought to be taken and
administered with the utmost solemnity."
Section 3189, further provides that the person administering the
oath shall "Require the party sworn to lay his hand upon the Holy
Evangelists of Almighty God, in token of his engagement to speak
the truth, as he hopes to be saved in the way and method of salvation
pointed out in that blessed volume; and in further token that, if he
should swerve from the truth, he may be justly deprived of all the
blessings of the Gospel, and made liable to that vengeance which he
has imprecated on his own head; and he shall kiss the Holy Gospel,
as a seal of confirmation to the said engagements."
It is further provided in Section 3190, as follows:
"When the person to be sworn shall be conscientiously scrup-
ulous of taking a book oath in manner aforesaid, he shall be excused
from laying hands upon, or touching the Holy Gospel; and the oath
required shall be administered in the following manner, namely: He
shall stand with his right hand lifted up towards heaven, in token of
his solemn appeal to the Supreme God, and also in token that if he
187 N. C. 581, 122 S. E. 386 (1924).
187 N. C. 581, 584, 122 S. E. 386, 389, citing State v. Davis, 80 N. C. 412(1879) ; McClure v. State, 1 Yerg. 206 (Tenn. 1829). See also N. C. Const.
Art. 6, §8 and Shaw v. Moore, 49 N. C. 25 (1856). This section of the North
Carolina Constitution provides that "All persons who shall deny the being of
Almighty God shall be disqualified for office."1
'See 28 R. C. L. 455; 12 Ann. Cas. 157 n.
36 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
should swerve from the truth he would draw down the vengeance of
heaven upon his head, and shall introduce the intended oath with
these words, namely: I, A. B., do appeal to God, as a witness of the
truth and the avenger of falsehood, as I shall answer the same at the
great day of judgment, when the secrets of all hearts shall be known."
By Section 3191, Quakers, Moravians and some .others are per-
mitted to affirm instead of swear.
These statutes were adopted in 1777 and are still in force.
The form of oath prescribed by the State of North Carolina for
a witness is as follows:
"You swear (or affirm) that the evidence you shall give to the
Court and jury in this action shall be the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth, so help you, God."'14
The Supreme Court held that the solemnity referred to in Sec-
tion 3188 "applies not only to the substance of the oath, but to the
form and manner of taking it and administering it."'r,
In State v. Pitt,16 Chief Justice Clark said: "The provision in
Revisal 2354 (now C. S. 3189), as to the manner of swearing is, as
Judge Pearson says, merely a form 'adapted to the religious belief
Df the general mass of citizens for the sake of convenience and uni-
formity.'"
Until a statute is passed in North Carolina similar to the statutes
passed in most of the states of the Union, providing that no person
shall be incompetent to testify on account of religious belief, it is safe
to say that the Supreme Court will hold that a witness who denies the
existence of a Supreme Being and does not believe in Divine punish-
ment, is incompetent to testify. It required a statute to change the
common law in this respect in other states, and in view of the reason-
ing of the Justices of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in the
cases referred to, and the significant language in the statutes of this
State as to oaths, it is safe to assume that the Supreme Court will
follow precedent and authority and leave it to the legislative branch
of the government to change the law.
"Professional and public opinion has come to see that whatever
the efficacy of the oath may be for those upon whose religious feelings
it exerts an influence, the absolute exclusion from the witness stand
of those who have scruples against taking it, or of those on whose
14 N. C. Cons. Stat. Ann. (1919) §3199.
1 State v. Davis, 69 N. C. 383 (1873) ; Pearce v. Polk, 123 N. C. 239, 31 S.
E. 479 (1898).
"' Supra note 4.
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belief it has no binding effect, is both unjust and unpolitic. Accord-
ingly, legislation has in most jurisdictions acted with the purpose of
removing these disadvantages."1 7 It is to be hoped that the Legis-
lature will abolish the common law rule still obtaining in North Caro-
lina.
The ruling of the trial judge upon the competency of a witness is
conclusive unless there is an abuse of discretion or it is based upon
an erroneous view of the law.
While some of the cases hold that the ruling of the trial Court as
to the competency of a witness is conclusive, the correct rule is that
his ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is an abuse of
discretion, or the Court admits or rejects the witness on an erroneous
construction of a legal principle. The principal cases in North Caro-
lina which have dealt with this question of practice as related to cases
involving the question of the moral sense or obligation of an oath
will now be briefly referred to.
In State v. Manuel,'8 it was held that the ruling of the trial judge
that a witness of tender years had sufficient intelligence and sense of
the obligation of an oath to be competent, was "a matter resting solely
in the discretion" of the trial judge and not reviewable by the Supreme
Court.
In State v. Edwards,19 in considering the ruling of the trial judge
that an infant six and one-half years of age at the time of the trial,
was competent to testify, the Court said "there being now no arbi-
trary rule as to age, and it being a question of capacity and of moral
and religious sensibility in any given case whether the witness is com-
petent, it must of necessity be left mainly, if not entirely, to the
discretion of the presiding judge."
In that case, which was an indictment for murder, the presiding
judge examined the witness on the question of competency on the
second day of the term and being of opinion that she had not sufficient
religious instruction, advised the Solicitor not to send her before the
grand jury. She was the daughter of the deceased. A true bill was,
however, found upon the evidence of another witness. Upon the
trial, which took place a few days afterwards, the judge examined
her again and held that she was a competent witness. It appeared
TGRENLF Ar, EVIDENCE (16th ed.) §370-A.
64 N. C. 601 (1870).
1 79 N. C. 648 (1878).
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that she had received religious instruction from her MVother during
the week the Court was in session.
In State v. Pitt, 20 the Court, speaking through Chief Justice
Clark, held that "the finding of the judge that the witnesses (who
were respectively eleven and twelve years old) were competent to
testify, was conclusive and not reviewable. This is so both as to
their moral and religious sensibility and their intelligence." Judges
Walker and Allen concurred in the result.
In Lanier v. Bryan,21 Judge Adams, referring to the decision in
State v. Pitt in which Chief Justice Clark said that the finding of
the trial court was conclusive, stated: "This decision seems to have
been based on the principle that where the trial judge, without par-
ticularly determining the facts, adjudges a person competent to be
a witness, his judgment is not subject to review because it implies a
finding of the requisite facts; and by an application of the principle
to that case, it appeared from the Judge's finding that the witnesses
had a sufficient comprehension of the obligation of an oath and the
way in which they expressed their conception of such obligation was
of secondary importance."
Judge Adams concludes by saying: "The decision approves the
doctrine that the witness should have due appreciation of a moral
duty to tell the truth, and conforms to the general rule that the judg-
ment of the trial judge on the question of the competency of a per-
son who is offered as a witness is a matter of discretion and will not
be disturbed on appeal, unless there is an abuse of discretion, or
unless the order admitting or rejecting the witness involves the erron-
eous construction of a legal principle."
The true doctrine is set forth in Lanier v. Bryan, that the order
of the trial Court may be reversed if there is an abuse of discretion
or if it is based upon an erroneous view of the law.22
In a proper case, it would be the duty of the trial judge, upon
request, to find the facts upon which his ruling was based.
THE LAw IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The requirement of the common law that a witness must believe
in a Supreme Being and Divine punishment in order to be competent
as a witness, has been abolished by statute or constitutional provision
in many states.
Supra note 4.
' Supra note 6.
See generally 28 R. C. L. 449.
QUALIFICATION OF A WITNESS
From an examination of the cases, statutes and constitutions, it
is found that in most of the states no religious belief is required to
render a witness competent. The common law rule, however, still
prevails in a few states, that a belief in Divine punishment or in the
existence of a Supreme Being is necessary in order to make a wit-
ness competent. In the following States, no religious belief is re-
quired to render a witness competent to testify: Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinbis, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia and
Wisconsin.
In the following States, a witness must believe in Divine punish-
ment or in the existence of a Supreme Being to be competent to tes-
tify: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Maryland, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and South Carolina.
In some states, it has been held that the rule excluding witnesses
on account of their religious views, does not apply where the witness
is also a party, and is testifying in his own behalf. 23
In Hroneck v. People,24 the Illinois Supreme Court said: "It is
clear from the authorities that the rule contended for does not apply
when the witness is testifying in his own behalf."
At common law a party to an action was not a competent witness
at the trial thereof and a defendant on trial for crime was not com-
petent as a witness in his own behalf.
The common law doctrine of incompetency arising from interest
has been abolished by statute in every state of the Union and in Eng-
land, but these statutes do not restore to competency persons who
are disqualified for reasons other than interest as parties or other-
wise.25
Practically all of the states, in which no religious belief is re-
quired to render a witness competent, have express statutory or con-
stitutional provisions providing in substance that no person shall be
incompetent to testify on account of religious belief.2 6
Percy v. Powers, 51 N. J. L. 432, 14 Am. St. Rep. 693 (1889) ; 28 R. C. L.
454; Note (1899) 42 L. R. A. 553.
"134 Ill. 139, 24 N. E. 861, 8 L. R. A. 837, 841 (1890).
"40 Cyc. 2244, 2256, 2259.
"State v. Washington, 49 La. Ann. 1602, 22 So. 841, 42 L. R. A. 553 (1897)
and note, where statutes and constitutional provisions in the various states are
set out and the earlier cases on the subject are collected; Pumphrey v. State,
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In some states, a witness may not be asked his religious views for
the purpose of impeaching his testimony.27
In New York, in the case of Brink v. Stratton,2 8 the Court of
Appeals held that: "A witness cannot be interrogated as to his belief
in a Supreme Being for the purpose of affecting his credibility." This
decision was by a divided Court and practically overruled the cases
of Stanbro v. Hopkins,2 9 and People v. Most.80
In other states, although the religious belief or disbelief does not
disqualify the witness, yet the credibility of the witness may be at-
tacked on this ground.
In Cambrell v. State of Mississippi,81 the Mississippi Supreme
Court said:
"Under oui: law it is a prerequisite of the right to testify that the
witness shall be sworn or affirmed to speak the truth. The object of
the oath or affirmation which the law requires of a witness before he
may testify is to obtain a hold on his conscience by thus reminding
him that there is a super-human power to whom he will be retribu-
tively accountable for any false statements. The oath or affirmation
presupposes a belief by the party making it in that superior power
which is clung to by all Christian people. As affecting the credit of
any witness' testimony, it may be shown that the party introduced
has no sense of the binding force of his oath or affirmation, because
he does not believe in a Supreme Being."82
The statute of 1869, 32 and 33 Vict. Chapter 68, removed in Eng-
land the disqualification of witnesses on account of their religious
belief or disbelief.
THE LAW IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The Federal statute provides as follows:
"The competency of a witness to testify in any civil action, suit
or proceeding in the courts of the United States, shall be determined
by the laws of the State or territory in which the court is held."88
84 Neb. 636, 122 N. W. 19, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1023 (1909) and note, where
some of the later cases are collected. See also JONES, EVIDmNCE (Horwitz)
§714; 2 ELLIOTr, EVmNCE, §§773-779; 40 Cyc. 2202.
Note (1910) 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1023.
176 N. Y. 150, 68 N. E. 148, 63 L. R. A. 182 (1903).
028 Barb. 265 (N. Y. 1858).30128 N. Y. 108, 27 N. E. 970 (1891).
3192 Miss. 728, 131 Am. St. Rep. 549, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 291 (1908).
See WIGmoR, EvmmcE (2d ed.) §§936, 1443; 4 JoNEs, EvIDENcE (Ho-
witz) §715.S28 U. S. C. A. §631.
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This section applies to civil cases only, and the United States
Courts are governed in the administration of the criminal law by the
rules of the common law. State statutes or decisions on questions of
evidence have no binding effect and the competency of witnesses is
determined by the law of the State in which the court is held as it
existed when the courts of the United States were established by the
Judiciary Act of 1789.34
In U. S. v. Miller,"5 the defendant objected to a witness testify-
ing on the ground of his religious belief. On being interrogated as
to his belief, he said: "I believe there is a creator, a cause for all
that we see and all that we hear. I think a man gets all his punish-
ment in this world, while he is here. I don't think it comes from God.
I think I could tell the truth if I never took an oath."
The constitution of the State of Washington provides: "No re-
ligious qualification shall be required for any public officer; nor shall
any person be incompetent as a witness or juror in consequence of
his opinion on matters of religion; nor be questioned in any court
of justice touching his religious belief to affect the weight of his
testimony."
The Court held that the constitution of the State of Washington
was not applicable as the competency of witnesses in criminal trials
in the Federal Courts is not governed by the statute of a State, but
by the common law, except where Congress has made specific pro-
vision on the subject, and that the act of Congress had not changed
the common law as to the competency of witnesses in criminal cases,
and the Court sustained the objection to the competency of the wit-
ness, saying:
"Under the common-law rule a person who does not believe in a
God who is the rewarder of truth and the avenger of falsehood, can-
not be permitted to testify. . . .District Judge Wilkin, in Fed. Cas.
No. 446, held that the testimony of an atheist is not admissible. In
U. S. v. Lee, Fed. Cas. No. 15, 586, Circuit Court of the District of
Columbia, it was held that a man who does not believe in the existence
of a God other than nature or in a future state of existence is not a
competent witness. In Wakefield v. Ross, Fed. Cas. No. 17,050, Dis-
trict of Rhode Island, it was held that a person who does not believe
in the existence of a God or in a future state of existence is not a
competent witness ...
" 28 U. S. C. A. §729 and notes; Logan v. U. S., 144 U. S. 263, 36 L. ed. 429
(1891) ; Jin Fuey Moy v. U. S., 254 U. S. 189, 65 L. ed. 214 (1920).
" 236 Fed. 798 (D. C. Wash., 1916).
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"The rigidity of this rule has been somewhat relaxed, and a per-
son has been permitted to testify who believed in the existence of a
God, who was the rewarder of truth and the avenger of falsehood,
either in this or a future life. This rule did not necessarily imply
that a person had to subscribe to his belief in the Christian religion.
If a person believes in the existence of a God, who rewards truth and
avenges falsehood, either in this or a future life, it is immaterial
whether that belief is in accordance with the Christian belief or not.
Any religious belief, whatever it may be, which recognizes the usual
form of oath administered as invoking Deity to witness its truthful-
ness, and recognizes that falsehood will be punished, is sufficient." a8
In Oliver v. United States,.87 the Court said:
"A witness was permitted to testify on behalf of the government,
though, after being first examined by counsel for the government
touching the matter of his competency as a witness, he stated that he
was thirteen years of age, but that he did not know the nature of an
oath. He was thereupon examined by the Court, and asked if he
knew what he was intefided to do when he was sworn to testify the
truth, and he replied 'To tell the truth.' It was peculiarly within
the province and discretion of the Court to determine the compe-
tency of the witness, and, in the absence of an abuse of discretion,
the testimony must be held to be competent.
"While it is true that the witness stated that he did not under-
stand the nature of an oath, it is doubtless true that the Court con-
cluded that his answer related to his inability to give a definition of
an oath in more or less technical terms, rather than to his knowledge
and realization of its obligation."
There is a dearth of authority in the Supreme Court of the United
States on this question. In the case of Wheeler v. United States,8
the Supreme Court held that a boy nearly five and a half years of
age is competent as a witness on a trial for murder to testify to the
homicide which took place when he was a little less than five years
old, if it appears from his examination that "he is intelligent and
understands the difference between truth and falsehood, and the
consequences of telling the latter, and also what is required by the
oath which he has taken."
' 236 Fed. 798, 799 (D. C. Wash. 1916).
"T 267 Fed. 544 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920).
"159 U. S. 523, 40 L. ed. 244 (1895).
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In Carver v. United States,2 9 the Court held when the dying
declarations of the deceased are admitted, they may be contradicted
in the same manner as other testimony, and "may be discredited by
proof that he did not believe in a future state of rewards or punish-
ments."
" 164 U. S. 694, 41 L. ed. 602 (1896).
[That the Supreme Court of the United States might not feel itself bound
to adhere to the traditional common law rule (as it obtained in 1789) as to
the requirement of religious belief as a condition of competency, is indicated
by the decision in Rosen v. U. S., 245 U. S. 467, 62 L. ed. 406 (1917) where the
analogous disqualification of "infamy" was held in the light of modern statutes
and legislation to be obsolete.-Ed.]
